Annexation and the Jurisdictional Attack in Indiana: The City Comes to Visit by McNaughton, George T.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 50 | Issue 2 Article 12
Winter 1975
Annexation and the Jurisdictional Attack in
Indiana: The City Comes to Visit
George T. McNaughton
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
McNaughton, George T. (1975) "Annexation and the Jurisdictional Attack in Indiana: The City Comes to Visit," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 50 : Iss. 2 , Article 12.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol50/iss2/12
Annexation and the Jurisdictional Attack in
Indiana: The City Comes to Visit
Within the near future Indiana's courts will be called upon to make
decisions which might either cripple the ability of municipalities to ex-
pand their borders or virtually remove any geographical restraint on
their annexation powers.' Pursuant to an authorizing statute, a muni-
cipality may annex "contiguous territory" by passing a special annexa-
tion ordinance. " Once passed, such an ordinance can be challenged in
two ways.3 The first is through recourse to a statutory appeal process
which determines whether certain factual preconditions to successful an-
nexation have been met.4  Under this process, the majority of land-
owners in the annexed territory or the owners of more than 75 percent
in assessed valuation of the real estate in the territory are permitted to
remonstrate against the annexation' on the grounds that the statutory
preconditions, known as determinants,' have not been satisfied. Under
this scheme, however, a municipality may annex territory for which the
determinants are not satisfied yet avoid the consequences of a successful
remonstrance by gerrymandering the boundaries of the annexed territory
so as to exclude the number of dissidents necessary to invoke the statu-
tory appeal process.7
1 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. City of Bloomington, Civil No. C73-C171 (Monroe
County, Ind. Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1975). This case was consolida-,ed under the name Otis
Elevator Co. v. City of Bloomington; however, that case did not involve the jurisdic-
tional question at issue here. Appeal has not yet been docketed.
2 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-20 (Code ed. 1974) (cities) ; zd. § 18-5-10-30 (towns).
This is not the only means of annexation: a city or town ma annex by means of re-
definition of boundaries. The "redefinition" statutes will not bu- dealt with in this note.
Landowners may also petition for annexation pursuant to id. § 18-5-10-23 (cities) ; id. §
18-5-10-30 (towns). There are also provisions for annexation of noncontiguous territory
for specific uses. Id. § 18-5-10-20.1 (cities) ; id. § 18-5-10-30.1 (towns).
3 In Indiana, annexations may only be reviewed by judicial proceedings. For a
general discussion of modes of review utilized elsewhere, see Woodroof, Systems and
Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 GEo. L.J. 743
(1970).
4IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-25 (Code ed. 1974) (cities), riade applicable to towns
by id. § 18-5-10-30.
5Id. § 18-5-10-24.
6 The term "determinants" actually is derived from Act of Mar. 11, 1955, ch. 269,
§ 2, [1955] Ind. Acts 723, repealed by City and Town Act of 1969, ch. 239, § 8, [1969]
Ind. Acts 922. The term "factors" is now used in the statute. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-
10-25 (Code ed. 1974). In this note "determinant" is synonymous with "factors."
7 By "appeal process" is meant the process described in th.3 following statutes for
cities: IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-24 (Code ed. 1974) (remonstrance petition) ; id. § 18-
5-10-25 (hearing); id. § 18-5-10-26 (judgment); and for towns: id. § 18-5-10-30.
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The second method of challenging annexation is an attack on the
municipality's jurisdiction to annex the territory in question.' Usually
taking the form of a suit for declaratory judgment,' such a jurisdictional
attack, unlike a remonstrance proceeding, may be initiated by a single
individual. Because it can be initiated by a single individual rather than
an entire class, the jurisdictional attack is obviously more difficult for a
municipality to avoid by gerrymandering than is the appeal process.
The sole question in a jurisdictional attack is whether the city coun-
cil (or town board) lacks statutory jurisdiction to annex the territory."
While there are several situations in which the municipality might lack
jurisdiction, of principal concern here is the situation in which the
annexed territory is not "contiguous" to existing boundaries as is re-
quired by the statute authorizing annexation."
The problem raised by the availability of both the jurisdictional
attack and the appeal process is in structuring the former to prevent
municipalities from circumventing the factual determinants by manipu-
lating territorial boundaries without fostering excessive litigation based
on frivolous claims of individual complainants. To resolve the issues of
when and by whom such an attack should be allowed, an understanding
of the need for the jurisdictional attack and its impact on the appeal
structure is crucial. Should Indiana's courts adopt an overly permissive
attitude toward jurisdictional attacks, the power of municipalities to
expand would be crippled; if, on the other hand, the courts unduly
limit such attacks, municipalities will, in effect, be able to circumvent the
appeal process by gerrymandering the boundaries of territories they wish
to annex. This note will explore the nature, role and necessity of the
jurisdictional attack and its relationship to the appeal process.
THE APPEAL PROCESS
Appeal Determinants
The term "determinant" refers to the factual issues that must be
8 See Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. -, 293 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
For an earlier example see Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 40 N.E. 267
(1895).
9 Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. - , 293 N.E.2d 540 (1973). Early
cases often involved the use of injunctions. See City of Delphi v. Startzman, 104 Ind.
343, 3 N.E. 937 (1885).
10 Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 40 N.E. 267 (1895).
11 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-20 (Code ed. 1974). See, e.g., Forsythe v. City of
Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 40 N.E. 267 (1895). "Jurisdiction" may be lacking in other
ways: lack of notice of impending annexation, Town of Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind.
541 (1883) ; lack of statutory publication, violation of the two-year prohibition against re-
annexation attempts by the city, Montagana v. City of Elkhart, 149 Ind. App. 283, 291,
271 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1971) (dictum).
[Vol. 50:403
CHALLENGES TO ANNEXATION
established by the municipality at a hearing after a remonstrance has
been filed. 2 There are three determinants enumerated in the remon-
strance provisions. They relate to the urban character or population
density of the annexed area, its geographical configuration, and the
municipality's ability to provide services to the area.'" There is also a
fourth provision which allows annexation of undeveloped areas in
certain circumstances.14 If, at the remonstance hearing, the municipality
cannot establish that the factual conditions demanded by the determin-
ants are present, the court must set the annexation attempt aside.'
Prior to the 1970 legislative revision of the determinants, courts
frequently made policy decisions in the guise of factual determinations. 6
Because of this, the pre-1970 determinants came under heavy fire on the
grounds that they violated the separation of powers clause of the Indiana
constitution 7 by delegating legislative powers to the judiciary, or by
calling upon the judiciary to make administrative decisions.' The 1970
legislative changes did not add any new policies, but rather established
factual determinants.'




I One may well query whether a determination that the an exation was "in the best
interests of the city and of the territory sought to be annexed" v. as a factual determinant.
See note 19 infra. But see City of Aurora v. Bryant, 240 Ind. 492, 165 N.E.2d 141 (1960),
construing Act of Mar. 11, 1955, ch. 269, § 2, [1955] Ind. Acts 723, repealed by City and
Town Act of 1969, ch. 239, § 8, [1969] Ind. Acts 922.
17 Art. 3, § 1.
18 The [annexation] decision is not based upon certain speciic facts which make
the law operative, but upon the implanting of a general feeling of public welfare
in the mind of the judge. Accordingly, the 1949 Indiana -knnexation Act, in-
sofar as it makes annexation turn upon an exercise of legislative discretion by
the circuit court, violates the separation of powers doctrine of the state as speci-
fied in Article III, Section I of the Indiana Constitution.
25 IND. L.J. 377, 382 (1950). The Indiana Supreme Court, hov ever, framed the test of
constitutionality in terms of whether the judiciary was being called upon to determine
factual issues or conditions. City of Aurora v. Bryant, 240 Ind. 192, 497-500, 165 N.E.2d
141, 144-46 (1960).
The courts have stressed the fact that the judiciary has not been delegated the in-
itiative in annexation; i.e., the city council still has the origiial choice of annexing.
See In re City of Mishawaka, - Ind. -, 289 N.E.2d 510 (1972), and City of Aurora,
supra.
Even conceding the legislative delegation issue, one still mright question whether,
under the prior determinants, the annexation proceeding constituted an administrative
function, which would also be unconstitutional under IND. CONs.T. art. 3, § 1. Perhaps
the most lucid overview of the constitutional wranglings is provkled in Justice DeBruler's
opinion in In re City of Mishawaka, supra, at - , 289 N.E.2d at 513-14.
t' Act of Mar. 11, 1955, ch. 269, § 2(a), [1955] Ind. Acts 723, repealed by City and
Town Act of 1969, ch. 239, § 8, [1969] Ind. Acts 922 (effective Jan. 1, 1970). Old de-
terminant (a) read: "The annexation is in the best interests of the city and of the ter-
ritory sought to be annexed." Act of Mar. 11, 1955, supra. To call such a determinant
1975]
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The geographical determinant, determinant (b), is central to the
relationship between the statutory appeal and the jurisdictional attack.
Prior to 1970, this determinant required that the annexed territory be
"a compact area abutting the municipality."2 Unlike the other pre-
1970 determinants, this was never labelled a policy question because
of its factual demonstrability. As such it was the mainstay of the re-
monstrator's case.2' In 1970 the legislature gave the old prescription a
degree of mathematical exactness, which the courts had theretofore
not supplied, by demanding coincidence of "one-eighth of the aggregate
external boundaries of the territory sought to be annexed"2 with the
boundaries of the annexing city.
What effect the quantification of the determinant will have is un-
known. However, it is reasonable to speculate that municipalities desir-
ing to annex noncompact areas will meet only the minimal contact re-
quired by the new determinant or will engage in gerrymandering.
There are many reasons why a municipality might be reluctant to
comply with the geographical determinant demanding coincidence of
"one-eighth of the aggregate external boundaries." For example, it
might not be able to encompass the territory desired by drawing bound-
ary lines to provide the needed coincidence of boundaries and still meet
the density or use qualifications in determinant (a).23 Another example
might be the municipality's lack of funds to provide the services re-
"factual" is to reach the outer limits of what may legitimately be termed a "fact." This
factor was not included in the 1969 revision. Old determinant (b) read: "The area is
urban in character, being an economic and social part of the annexing city." Id. It is
now contained in determinant (a) of the new law:
The resident population of the area sought to be annexed is equal to at least
three (3) persons for each acre of land included within its boundaries or that
the land is zoned for commercial, business or industrial uses or that sixty per-
cent (60%) of the land therein is subdivided ....
IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-25 (Code ed. 1974). Old determinant (d) required: "The
city is financially able to provide municipal services to the annexed area within the rea-
sonably near future." Act of Mar. 11, 1955, supra. It is now contained in new deter-
minant (c) :
The annexing city has developed a fiscal plan and has established a definite
policy to furnish the territory to be annexed within a period of three (3) years,
governmental and proprietary services substantially equivalent in standard and
scope to the governmental and proprietary services furnished by the annexing
city to other areas of the city which have characteristics of topography, patterns
of land utilization and population density similar to the territory to be an-
nexed . ...
IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-25 (Code ed. 1974).
20 Act of Mar. 11, 1955, ch. 269, § 2(f), [1955] Ind. Acts 723, repealed and replaced
by City and Town Act of 1969, ch. 239, § 407, [1969] Ind. Acts 902 (codified at IND. ANN.
STAT. § 18-5-10-25(b) (Code ed. 1974)).
21 In re City of Mishawaka, - Ind. - , 289 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1972).
22 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-25(b) (Code ed. 1974).
2 Id. § 18-5-10-25 (a).
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quired by determinant (c) if the boundaries are drawn to provide the
necessary one-eighth coincidence." Yet, these determinants are de-
signed to protect the interests of the community by "provid[ing] a fair
structure in which to resolve the conflict between the competing interests
of the city on the one hand, and that of the inhabitants of the annexed
area on the other.
25
Limited Standing
Access to the appeal process is strictly limited to landowners in the
annexed territory, and then a majority of such landowners or the
owners of 75 percent in assessed valuation of the territory's real estate
must act in concert before a remonstrance hearing will be set." This
provision restricting standing is clearly a screening device to limit
the number of annexation contests.2 It may al30 suggest that the
legislature intended to hold the municipality to the rigors of the appeal
determinants only when the aforementioned classes oppose annexation.
This intent may also be inferred from the statutory exception to the
two-year prohibition on reannexation attempts,20 which arises when
target area landowners subsequently petition for annexation during
the two-year period.2"
The existence of the provision limiting standing in the appeal
process is a factor that courts should consider in re3olving issues which
241d. § 18-5-10-25(c).
25It re City of Mlshawaka, - Ind. , , 289 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1972).
26 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-24 (Code ed. 1974), id. § 18-5-10-25 (cities); id. § 18-
5-10-30 (towns).
27This limitation on standing for appeal was construed by thse appellate court sitting
en banc in Daubenspeck v. City of Ligonier, 135 Ind. App. 565. 183 N.E.2d 95 (1962),
transfer denied, 245 Ind. 20, 191 N.E.2d 100 (1963).
It seems to us the legislature believed that an appeal of an nnexation ordinance
should not be permitted by only one or more persons who believed they were ag-
grieved or injuriously affected by such ordinance. It ther.efore provided such
an appeal could be only taken by a majority of the owners of land in the terri-
tory. It also added a new class which could initiate such ax appeal, namely, the
owners of more than seventy-five (75) percent in assessed xvaluation of the real
estate in the territory.
Id. at 572, 183 N.E.2d at 98. This ruling is somewhat vitiated by the Indiana Supreme
Court's denial of transfer: "The petition to transfer is denied. By denying transfer
herein we do not thereby approve of all the language of the Appellate Court opinion."
245 Ind. at 21, 191 N.E.2d at 100 (entire opinion).
28 INi. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-26 (Code ed. 1974).
20 One may also at least query whether the legislature was toying with a form of an
election process when it devised the standing requirement. There has been considerable
debate over whether such standing provisions constitute voting rights, which would call
into play fourteenth amendment guarantees. Indiana's courts, however, have held this




arise by jurisdictional attack. This is especially true considering the
similarity of the jurisdictional requirement of contiguity"0 and the
appeal determinant of one-eighth coincidence."' To the extent "con-
tiguity" and coincidence of "one-eighth of the aggregate external
boundaries" are equated, the remonstrance provisions limiting standing
to appeal and the policies behind that limitation may be circumvented.
Dissidents could ignore the cumbersome features of the appeal process
and challenge every annexation lacking the necessary one-eighth coin-
cidence of boundaries through a jurisdictional attack brought by a
single individual.
THE JURISDICTIONAL ATTACK
The jurisdictional attack arose separately from the remonstrance
structure.32 Since it is not an appeal, the statutory determinants do not
apply. Rather, as indicated above, the sole question is whether the
city council had jurisdiction to annex.3 Lack of jurisdiction most likely
arises from the council's failure to comply with the statutory require-
ment that the territory it annexes be contiguous to the municipality.
Absence of contiguity is the most important basis of a jurisdictional
attack since the other jurisdictional requirements can usually be satis-
fied by competent counsel and since the requirement of contiguity is
closely related to the determinant of one-eighth coincidence of the
aggregate external boundaries.
A lone dissident may contest the annexation on jurisdictional
grounds without the support of his neighbors since a remonstrance peti-
30 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-20 (Code ed. 1974).
31Id. § 18-5-10-25(b).
32 The jurisdictional attack arose in early equity proceedings seeking to enjoin an
attempted annexation. Before 1905, the controlling statutes gave the county commis-
sioners discretionary 'power to annex, notwithstanding the protests of residents of the
territory to be annexed, and provided no criteria for annexation upon which judicial re-
view could be based. See Chandler v. City of Kokomo, 137 Ind. 295, 36 N.E. 847 (1894) ;
Arnholt v. City of Columbus, 128 Ind. App. 253, 256-57, 145 N.E.2d 660, 661-62 (1957).
With no statutory remonstrance procedure available, resistance to annexation appeared
as attacks upon the jurisdiction of the annexing city. See City of Delphi v. Startzman,
104 Ind. 343, 3 N.E. 937 (1885) ; Strosser v. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443 (1885);
Windman v. City of Vincennes, 58 Ind. 480 (1877) ; City of Peru v. Bearss, 55 Ind. 576
(1877). The jurisdictional attack is still available today as an alternative to the statutory
remonstrance proceedings. See Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. - , 293
N.E.2d 540 (1973).
During the early period most of the opinions focused on whether the defect was a
mere irregularity in the proceedings, or whether it involved jurisdiction to annex. See,
e.g., Grusenmeyer v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 549, 555-56 (1881). This distinction,
often used to defeat jurisdictional attacks, is no longer important, having been removed
by Arnholt v. City of Columbus, 128 Ind. App. 253, 145 N.E.2d 660 (1957).
3 Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 509-10, 40 N.E. 267, 268-69 (1895).
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tion is not necessary to bring a jurisdictional attack. 4 Thus, where the
circulation of a remonstrance petition would be too costly, or where it
would be impossible to obtain the required number of signatures, this
form of attack may still be open to the dissident. Instead of statutory
standing, his standing is based on his right as a citizen to enforce public
rights.35 In order to understand the nature of the jurisdictional attack
and its impact on the statutory appeal structure, the remainder of this
note will focus on the two crucial elements of the jurisdictional attack:
the statutory requirements of contiguity and the requirements that
courts have formulated for defining the standing requisite to initiate a
challenge.
Contiguity
"Contiguity" and "contiguous territory" are terms of art in an-
nexation law.3" Whatever meaning is ascribed to the language in the
authorization statute 7 must be derived from viewing annexation law
as a whole, not by concentrating on the authorization statute alone.
Given the more frequent use of the jurisdictional attack' and the
1970 revision of the appeal determinants, Indiana courts are presently
34 There are other characteristics of the juriidictional attack which will not be pur-
sued at great length in this note, but which deserve mentioning here. In a jurisdictional
attack the complainant has the burden of proof, whereas in th( statutory appeal it rests
with the municipality. See Montagana v. City of Elkhart, 149 Ind. App. 283, 292 n.2, 271
N.E.2d 475, 480 n.2 (1971). Also, the jurisdictional attack does not have to be filed
within the sixty-day period as required in the case of a remonstrance. See Windman v.
City of Vincennes, 58 Ind. 480, 485 (1877). See also Forsythe V. City of Hammond, 142
Ind. 505, 515, 40 N.E. 267, 270 (1895), to the effect that a "void" annexation may always
be attacked.
To avoid the disruption caused by invalidating a long-established annexation, the
courts in the past have at times resorted to the doctrine of lacles. See Huff v. City of
Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14, 8 N.E. 701 (1886). Whether laches could cure an annexation
devoid of contiguity is open to speculation.
3r Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. , , 293 N.E.2d 540, 541-43
(1973).
30 1 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONM § 294 (rev. 2d ed. 1940)
(footnote omitted) : "Laws usually require in express terms, that, to authorize annexa-
tion the territory must be contiguous or adjacent to the municipal corporation that desires
to include it." See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 589 (1973).
37 IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-20 (Code ed. 1974).
38 It should be realized that use of the declaratory judgment procedure in Reaf-
snyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. -, 293 N.E.2d 540 (1973), will increase the
number of contested annexations. Reafsnyder was the latest jurisdictional attack to have
reached the appellate courts. However, the annexation under attack in Reafsnyder was
one enacted under the old appeal structure. Hence the exact r(lationship of "contiguous
territory" to coincidence of one-eighth of the aggregate external boundaries has yet to be
determined in the appellate courts. However, the question was considered in a lower
court decision. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. City of Bloomington, Civil No. C73-
C171 (Monroe County, Ind., Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1975). In that c .se "contiguous territory"
and "one-eighth coincidence" were considered synonymous.
1975]
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in a position to redefine the concept of "contiguous territory." This
redefinition should consider not only the fact situation before the court,
but also the effect the definition will have on the behavior of munici-
palities and landowners in the future.
Of necessity, the amount of contact between the municipality and
the annexed territory demanded by the jurisdictional requirement of
contiguity must fall somewhere on the spectrum of contact ranging
from "mere touching" to the full coincidence of "one-eighth of the ag-
gregate external boundaries of the territory sought to be annexed" with
the boundaries of the annexing city. The basic issue is whether or not
the jurisdictional standard should differ from the appeal determinant.
If a dual standard is adopted, the jurisdictional definition can require
neither a greater amount of contact than the appeal determinant, nor an
equivalent amount, without rendering the appeal determinant super-
fluous.
Assuming arguendo that there should be a dual standard, the ques-
tion becomes whether the jurisdictional test should be "mere touching"
or something more. Arizona courts felt compelled by their state constitu-
tion to wash their hands of annexation disputes.39 This was effectively
accomplished by the adoption of the "mere touching" standard." Under
that standard, a municipality was allowed to annex a road which
travelled out from the city, turned left, travelled a considerable distance
and then turned left again, returning to the city." Only the road itself
was annexed. None of the circumscribed area was affected. With
"touching" as the standard, there is no jurisdictional limitation as a
practical matter.
In contrast, the Michigan appellate court concocted a definition of
"contiguity" demanding more than regularity of borders and reasonable
39 State v. City of Phoenix, 74 Ariz. 46, 51, 243 P.2d 766, 770 (1952).
40 See City of Safford v. Town of Thatcher, 17 Ariz. App. 25, 28, 495 P.2d 150, 153
(1972):
Thus, in Arizona, where the courts are not concerned with the motive,
wisdom, or reasonableness of the annexation, it is sufficient if the land sought to
be annexed touches the land to which it is to be annexed. The legislative pur-
pose-to extend the corporate limits-is clearly served by any increase thereof.
The proposition urged by the Arizona court is highly questionable, yet common. While
it may be correct to grant the same deference to the municipal council as to the state
legislature for many purposes, in this situation higher allegiance is due to the state legis-
lature's purpose. At least one court has gone even further, stating that even if the state
enacted a statute purporting to give the municipality unbounded discretion in annexation,
the authorization would have to be considered "cuin grano sails." City of Denver v.
Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 477, 39 P. 425, 427 (1894).




compactness of the annexed territory. 2 Such a standard would play
havoc with Indiana's remonstrance structure because it seemingly ex-
pands the jurisdictional requirement of contiguity to include all the
appeal determinants.
Ohio and, at least to some extent, Illinois have adopted a proscrip-
tive standard.43 This standard is not easily explained in positive terms.
Rather, it is a negative test aimed at preventing abuse. Perhaps the test
employed by one Illinois appellate court comes as close as possible to a
definition:
The intent of the legislature, as determined by courts is that the
word "contiguous" means that the territory to be annexed must
have "a substantial common boundary" . . . , or must have a
"common border of reasonable length or width" . . , or must
"touch or adjoin one another in a reasonable substantial physical
sense" . 44
Note that the court refrained from mentioning irregularities in the
borders and compactness of the territory, stressing instead some ag-
gregate amount of contact. Illinois has been able to differentiate an
annexation involving pretext contiguity from one involving an area
which is not compact:
"[C]ontiguous" does not implicitly require that the area must also
be "compact" . . . . The territory sought to be annexed has a
common boundary with the village of almost one-quarter of a mile.
There are no areas which merely comer on another area nor are
there mere strips of land used as a subterfuge to reach outlying
areas of land to be annexed which are found in the cases relied
42 Township of Owosso v. City of Owosso, 385 Mich 587, 591, 189 N.W.2d
421, 422 (1971). The standard was apparently derived from language such as that set
forth in E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 36, § 294 (footnote omitted) :
Contiguous lands are such as are not separated from the corporation by outside
land; such as are so situated with reference to the corporation that it may rea-
sonably be expected that after annexation they will unite with the corporation
in making a homogeneous city, which will afford to its several parts the ordi-
nary benefits of local government. But however near they are to the petitioning
corporation, if the circumstances are such that it could not reasonably be ex-
pected that the parts would amalgamate and form a municipal unit which would
afford to each the ordinary benefits of local government it would not be proper
to annex them. "When actual unity is impracticable, legal unity should not be
attempted."
43 Watson v. Doolittle, 10 Ohio App. 2d 143, 151, 226 N.E.2d 771, 776 (1967). See
People ex rel. Cherry Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Rockford, 120 Ill. App. 2d
275, 286, 256 N.E.2d 653, 658-59 (1970). For an extended corrpilation of Illinois cases,
see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 589 (1973).
44 People ex rel. Cherry Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Rockford, 120 Ill.
App. 2d 275, 284, 256 N.E.2d 653, 658 (1970).
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upon by appellants. Therefore, we believe that the territory is
contiguous to the village. ... 45
As the Illinois court demonstrates, use of the proscriptive approach can
prevent abusive annexations without confining the municipalities to in-
flexible standards.
To maintain a dual standard, the jurisdictional definition of "con-
tiguity" cannot encompass, as the Michigan test does, all of the factors
included in the appeal determinants. On the other hand, the need to deter
gerrymandering is not met by the Arizona standard of "mere touching."
Hence, an intermediate standard, such as the proscriptive approach,
would be required.
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw,4"
appears to have adopted the proscriptive approach. That case involved
an annexation which connected the bulk of the annexed territory to
the city by means of a narrow strip of land. The court, without defining
"contiguity," simply held that the territory was not contiguous. The
court clearly indicated that pretext contiguity would not satisfy the
jurisdictional standard.
Although the proscriptive approach is somewhat vague, its vague-
ness tends to evaporate when applied to the facts of a given case. The
following is a good statement of the test: where it is self-evident from
the description of the annexation that the annexed territory, viewed as
a whole, merely touches or corners on the municipality in such a way as
to deny that the "contiguity" supplied is anything other than a pretext,
there is no jurisdiction.
Having argued that a proscriptive approach is better than either of
the extreme definitional approaches illustrated by the Arizona and
Michigan standards, the discussion must turn to whether a proscriptive
approach is more desirable than an approach which quantifies "con-
tiguity" as one-eighth coincidence of boundaries. In other words, is a
dual standard desirable?
45 Inre Annexation of Lands of the Village of Glen Carbon, 130 Ill. App. 2d 821,
822-23, 264 N.E.2d 283, 284 (1970).
-4 Ind. App. - , -, 293 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1973).
471d. at - , 293 N.E.2d at 545 (1973).
The Ohio courts have also taken a dim view of following roads out to developed
tracts.
We find that the area surrounding the Ohio Turnpike, composed of approxi-
mately two-thirds of the territory sought to be annexed, is an area not adjacent
to, nor is it contiguous or adjoir~ng to, the village of Pioneer. The proposed
annexation of this Turnpike Area by means of a long narrow connecting strip
fails to fulfill the requirements of the annexation statutes with references to ter-
ritory being "adjacent, contiguous, or adjoining."
Watson v. Doolittle, 10 Ohio App. 2d 143, 151, 226 N.E.2d 771, 776 (1967).
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The effect of adopting a single standard would be to enable a lone
dissident to hold the municipality to the high geographical standard of
one-eighth coincidence, despite the lack of the signed remonstrance de-
manded by the appeal process. In contrast, a proscriptive approach would
curb the more blatant gerrymandering operations without undermining
the remonstrance provisions limiting standing.4 In most instances, a
proscriptive standard would tend to force muncipalities to comply
with guidelines set forth by the appeal determinants while still allowing
for a reasonable amount of flexibility where the landowners desire an-
nexation.
Standing
The standing requirements for a jurisdictional attack may be
gleaned from comments in Montagana v. City of Elkhart,49 although
the court's analysis there is anything but clear." In Montagana a tax-
payer of the annexing municipality brought a suit challenging the an-
nexation. The court said that an action for waste of public funds
would lie where the city council's acts were patently illegal and an abuse
of discretion. 1 The court cited, as an example of waste, expenditures
for an annexation encompassing territory over which the council did
not have jurisdiction, i.e., where annexation is illegal. The test is
circuitous in that the taxpayer has standing if there is waste, and there
is waste if the annexation is illegal.52 Thus, the court must reach the
merits to know whether the taxpayer has standing."5
48 There is language in In re Annexation of Certain Territory to City of Princeton
v. City of Princeton, 128 Ind. App. 104, 114-15, 146 N.E.2d 422, 427 (1957), to the effect
that the old determinant of "compact area" was meant as a device to prevent gerry-
mandering. The court quotes an Illinois case which considered the compactness require-
ment as distinct from contiguity. The Indiana case, if read lterally, could be said to
adopt "touching" as the definition of "contiguity," and leaves the appeal determinant as
the sole control for gerrymandering. Relying solely on an appeal determinant to curb
gerrymandering is an extremely inefficient means of prohibiting that evil.
41 149 Ind. App. 283, 271 N.E.2d 475 (1971).
No See id. at 289-90, 271 N.E.2d at 479.
F Id. at 290, 271 N.E.2d at 479.
52 If in a given situation these or other illegal acts taint the annexation, wastage
under the ordinance would be present or certain to occur. Wastage in the same
sense would occur where the annexation decision constitutes a patent abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 291, 271 N.E.2d at 480.
5
3 It cannot be seriously questioned that taxpayers of an annexing city who do
not qualify as remonstrators can maintain a declaratory judgment suit to chal-
lenge an annexation ordinance. Such suit, however, may only be allowed to
proceed where the actions of the city common council in annexing specific ter-
ritory are clearly or patently illegal, or where the council acts without jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, or where there is an unmistakable abuse of discre-
tion in the council's decision to annex, or where wastage of public funds is pres-
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This test is used to distinguish a public suit from the normal
private suit where standing stems from property rights or some other
interest beyond the interests of taxpayers or citizens generally. The
test has two components: an allegation that the annexation was illegal,
and the individual's special stake or toehold in the public right against
illegal annexations. For example, where a taxpayer attacks annexation
of noncontiguous territory, standing would be analyzed as follows:
Lack of jurisdiction would supply the first component, and the tax-
payer's status or stake in the public funds would supply the toehold.
Since ipso facto every jurisdictional attack involves an alleged lack of
jurisdiction, what is of real importance is the nature of the "toehold"
required. 4
The "public right" formulation in Montagana was seized upon in
a declaratory judgment action brought by annexed landowners in Reaf-
sn3yder. 5 There the court referred to the statements in Montagana
with respect to the public right and concluded that since the annexation
was illegal, the landowners had the requisite standing to bring the
action.5" The court did not define the necessary "toehold" of the indi-
vidual, presumably attributing it to the mere status of being an annexed
landowner, or a subject of the future tax levies.
It could be argued that Montagana does not directly support Reaf-
snyder. In Montagana, had the annexation been illegal, the only pos-
sible remedy for the municipality's taxpayers would have been a juris-
dictional attack since the remonstrance provisions are available only to
annexed landowners." In Reafsnyder, however, annexed landowners
ent or imminent and is something more than the furnishing of the normal serv-
ices and facilities attendant legal annexation, all as hereinbefore noted. This
court is of the opinion that plaintiffs-appellants in the instant case did not have
sufficient interest in the matter here considered to warrant consideration of their
action in the trial court.
Id. at 292, 271 N.E.2d at 480-81 (footnote omitted).
54 The concept of a two-component standing is drawn from a comment in Zoercher
v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 222, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930) :
In the case at bar, the appellees are suing for a determination or establishment
of public rights, and, at the same time, it is apparent that, as taxpayers of South
Bend, their personal and property rights are also involved and will be injured if
a tax is illegally levied. There is an actual controversy here relative to some
right and status of appellees, and they are entitled to maintain this action.
55 Reafsnyder v. City of 'Warsaw, - Ind. App. , ., 293 N.E.2d 540, 543
(1973).
56 Id. at -, 293 N.E.2d at 542-43. Note that Reafsnyder does not refer to any
specific toehold such as the taxpayer's right to prevent "wastage" of public funds. Since
a landowner does not pay taxes until after the annexation, he has no stake in the public
funds being wasted. However, the stake may be implicit in his status as a potential an-
nexed landowner since he will then become subject to illegal tax levies.
Z; IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-5-10-24 (Code ed. 1974). Note especially the language
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brought the suit." Thus in order for Montagana to apply, the court must
have recognized a jurisdictional standard for annexed landowners
distinct from the remonstrance provisions.
The right of a landowner to bring a jurisdictional attack is implicit
in the appeal structure. Without it, the municipality could manipulate
the boundaries of the area to be annexed so as to encompass only a
minority of dissidents owning less than 75 percent of the assessed
valuation. This is the problem which Reafsnyder addresses in defining
the requisite standing, 9 but it should be recognized that this result is
not a panacea. Recognizing standing for an annexed landowner will
affect pretext contiguity only where at least one dissident is included
in the annexation. This inherent limitation may foster gerrymandering
of a slightly different form.
The problem is illustrated by the practice of "leapfrog" annexation.
This term refers to a municipality's attempt to encompass dissidents
through a series of separate annexations. For example, a city council
annexes territory which lacks the necessary amount of border contact
with the municipality, but the annexation goes unchallenged because
the territory contains no dissidents. This initial annexation then pro-
vides the necessary amount of border contact with a territory which
does contain dissidents. Thereafter, the annexation of this territory is
invulnerable to attack on the ground that the geographical determinant
has not been satisfied.
While the issue has never been decided in Indiana, courts in other
states have generally refused standing to landowners who are only the
potential targets of leapfrog annexation. In Smith v. City of Aurora,"
an often cited Colorado case, the plaintiff, an owner of land adjacent to
the annexed territory, was denied standing to chalenge the annexation
because he was not directly affected. The setting appears to have been
part of a leapfrog scheme. The annexation challenged by Smith would
have provided sufficient contiguity for a second annexation encompassing
quoted in note 53 supra: "taxpayers of an annexing city who do not qualify as remon-
strators . . . . " Montagana v. City of Elkhart, 149 Ind. App. 283, 292, 271 N.E.2d 475,
480 (1971).
58 The argument contra to Reafsnyder would be that the rrnonstrance and appeal is
the exclusive remedy available to annexed landowners. It would be more accurate, how-
ever, to consider the landowner's right to remonstrate as a protection similar to the
municipal taxpayer's protection inherent in the representative nature of the city council.
Hence, the availability of a remonstrance and appeal should not preclude the ability to
attack the jurisdiction of the municipality.
59 See Reafsnyder v. City of Warsaw, - Ind. App. , , 293 N.E.2d 540,
542-43 (1973).
60 153 Colo. 204, 385 P.2d 129 (1963).
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his land, an annexation which he then could not have successfully
contested."' The majority of the court was not concerned by the con-
sequences of such a narrow concept of who is "aggrieved" or
"affected."62 The dissent, however, aptly pointed out the dangers of the
leapfrog trap.6"
There is a series of Ohio cases on the subject of standing for non-
annexed landowners64 who object because of the annexation's effects
upon the organization of school districts. In Branson v. Cain the court
pointed out that the plaintiff's status as an adjacent landowner did not
differentiate him from other (nonannexed and nonadjacent) landowners
who were protesting because of the restructuring of the school district.65
Therefore, standing was denied. However, since Branson did not in-
volve the leapfrogging problem, these Ohio cases should be of minimal
precedential value.
Two other jurisdictions have passed on the matter. Alabama relied
almost totally upon the Colorado case.66 The other case, which was heard
61 Id. at 206, 385 P.2d at 130.
It is urged that Smith has a grievance that is not common to other land-
owners outside the area to be annexed, in that following the annexation his own
property becomes vulnerable to annexation to the city due to the fact that it
will then be contiguous to the city and his chances of remaining outside its boun-
daries will be lessened by reason thereof.
621d.
However he will not suffer in property or in person by reason of the annexa-
tion proceedings to which he objects. No burden or obligation is imposed upon
him or his property by the adoption of the annexation ordinance of which he
complains.
Id.
63 Id. at 207, 385 P.2d at 130-31 (Frantz, C.J., dissenting):
The municipality need wait only until the expiration of the ninety-day period
before it undertakes to annex Smith's property which becomes contiguous to the
municipality by virtue of the alleged invalid annexation, but with which Smith
then becomes trapped by the narrow construction of what constitutes "any per-
son aggrieved." He is powerless to assert invalidity because he is by interpreta-
tion held to be a person not aggrieved and after the ninety days the annexation
becomes incontestable.
Note here that what was involved was an interpretation of an appeal statute (CoLo.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 139-10-6 (1963)). The statute of limitations trap discussed in the
dissent may not be present in Indiana. It has been held that the 60-day limit does not
apply where there is a jurisdictional defect. Windman v. City of Vincennes, 58 Ind.
480, 485 (1877).
It is at least arguable that a prior annexation cannot be attacked collaterally when
the second annexation occurs. If it is so held, then the same type of trap would be
present in Indiana.64See, e.g., Markos v. Cain, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 563, 154 N.E.2d 196, 198 (C.P.
Franklin County 1955).65 Branson v. Cain, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 23-24, 146 N.E.2d 892, 894 (C.P. Franklin
County 1956).66 Purdy v. City of Vestavia Hills, 286 Ala. 714, 718, 246 So. 2d 440, 444 (1971).
[Vol. 50:403
CHALLENGES TO ANNEXATION
by a federal district court, arose under Nebraska law.67 In the latter
case, the municipality was trying to encompass a federal military base
by way of leapfrog annexation. The court dismissed the United States'
claim challenging the first annexation since the United States was not
an affected property owner. However, the leapfrogging was foiled
since the court concluded on two other grounds that the second annexa-
tion which encompassed the federal property was invalid."8 In summary,
the case law in other jurisdictions disfavors standing for the intended
victim of leapfrog schemes. The question, however, remains open in
Indiana.
Rea fsnyder shifts the annexation battleground from the general
problem of the requirements of contiguity to the problem of limiting
the municipalities' ability to engage in leapfrog annexation. Recognition
of this fact should help Indiana courts tackle the problem of whether
to give standing to potential leapfrog victims and, if so, how that stand-
ing should be structured."9 First of all, gerrymandering of boundaries is
encouraged only when standing is formulated in terms of the geo-
graphical classes of individuals affected rather than in terms of the
problem to be solved. For example, the classes accorded standing under
the remonstrance provisions set the stage for annexations designed to
eliminate dissidents from those classes. Reafsizyder, in attempting to
cure the pretext contiguity problem, granted standing in jurisdictional
attacks to the class of annexed landowners;"° thus, in the future all
dissidents will be excluded from this class.
The logical result of structuring standing in terms of geographical
classes is that if the court allows adjacent landowners standing to bring
suits for declaratory judgment, the process of annexation will be broken
down further into three stages-ad infinitum. Or, the other hand, if
the court refuses to grant standing to the adjacent landowner, the policy
against pretext contiguity enunciated in Reafsnyder will be thwarted
by leapfrog annexation schemes.7'
6'United States v. City of Bellevue, 334 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 474
F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1973).
However, this Court need not decide the validity of that particular ordinance,
because it appears from the record that the United States owned none of the
land involved in the annexation pursuant thereto. The United States therefore
has no standing to question the validity thereof, and this Court presumes that
the ordinance and annexation were valid.
334 F. Supp. at 886. On appeal the question as to the first annexation was not raised;
only the grounds as to the invalidity of the second annexation were discussed.
68 Id. at 887.
00 See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
70- Ind. App. - , -, 293 N.E.2d 540, 542-43 (1973).
7' Id. at - , 293 N.E.2d at 545.
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By taking a problem-oriented approach to standing, the court could
allow the adjacent landowner standing if he shows that he is the intended
victim of leapfrogging. Such a limitation on standing would inhibit
leapfrogging, place an added deterrent against pretext contiguity, and
avoid the ad infinitum effect that would occur by conferring standing
on the entire class of adjacent landowners.
Perhaps the best resolution of the problem involves a third ap-
proach: a collateral attack on the first annexation made during an ac-
tion against the second annexation. If pretext contiguity is an insufficient
basis for jurisdiction to annex, then any such annexation would be void
and should not be allowed to supply contiguity, or one-eighth coincidence,
for a subsequent annexation. When such a leapfrog scheme takes place,
a jurisdictional attack could be launched, with the complainant claiming
that since the first annexation was void ab initio, it cannot be included
as part of the municipality's borders in calculating one-eighth coin-
cidence for the second annexation. Such an approach is permissible
given the opinion in Forsythe v. City of Hammond,"2 which states that
a void annexation" can be attacked collaterally whenever its legality is
brought into issue. When a municipality attempts to include illegal
annexations in its boundaries to justify a subsequent annexation, the
question of the legality of the prior annexation is properly raised."'
Allowing collateral attacks would enable the court to avoid the
anomolous result of Smith v. City of Aurora.71 There, the "contiguity"
in question was an appeal determinant and not a jurisdictional require-
ment; hence, when the statute of limitations had run, the annexation was
presumed valid. In Indiana, the 60-day limitation does not bar juris-
dictional attacks,75 and since contiguity is a jurisdictional requirement,
the limitation would be inapplicable.
72 142 Ind. 505, 515, 40 N.E. 267, 270 (1895).
7 8 It should be realized that some reasonable time constraint must be placed upon the
invalidation of a prior annexation by a collateral attack. The doctrine of laches or
estoppel cannot be applied in this situation, since the landowner does not have standing
until the municipality attempts to encompass his property in the second annexation.
Since most leapfrog schemes anticipate a fairly rapid sequence of annexations, the like-
lihood of such a collateral attack affecting a long-established annexation is remote. How-
ever, if such a dilemma ever occurs where the first annexation has been considered a
part of the municipality for over a decade (to give an extreme example) the court may
invoke the concept of de facto annexation to prevent an overly harsh result in this ex-
treme situation. Applying the doctrine of de facto annexation would preserve the long-
established annexation entered into in good faith where municipal funds have been spent
on extensive improvements. For a recent explication of de facto annexation and its deri-
vation from de facto incorporation, see Port Valdez Co. v. City of Valdez, 522 P.2d
1147, 1152-55 (Alas. 1974).
74 153 Colo. 204, 385 P.2d 129 (1963).
75 See note 63 supra.
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Even under the above approaches, one problem remains: What if
there is no second annexation or any leapfrog Echeme? In such a
situation an illegal annexation would go uncontested if the taxpayers
and the landowners desired it. This situation raises the question of the
purpose behind the annexation laws. If the state legislature set juris-
dictional requirements pursuant to an overall notioa of how and when
annexations should occur, then, to the extent illegal annexations went
uncontested, that purpose would be thwarted."6 But, if the only purpose
of the requirements is to grant protection to potential victims of the
municipality's illegal actions, this last situation presents no problem
because there are no real victims.
Thus it can be seen that a strictly geographical approach to the
determination of standing would merely have the effect of encouraging
municipalities to make piecemeal annexations. A problem-oriented ap-
proach would protect those persons in need of protection, yet might
result in precipitous attacks by landowners, based on the suspicion that
municipalities are engaged in leapfrog annexation. The collateral attack,
coupled with the standing requirements provided by the Reafsnyder and
Montagaia cases, provides adequate protection without burdening mu-
nicipal expansion with premature challenges.
SUMMARY
Indiana's remonstrance provisions need to be safeguarded by allow-
ing jurisdictional attacks. With the rise of gerrymandering de-
vices, the appeal determinants will be severely undermined unless the
jurisdictional requirement that annexed territory be contiguous is con-
strued as calling for more than "mere touching." On the other hand,
if the contiguity requirement is construed as synonymous with the
coincidence of "one-eighth of the aggregate external boundaries," the
policy of the remonstrance provisions limiting the ability to bring ap-
peals would be thwarted. A compromise, best referred to as a pro-
scriptive approach to "pretext contiguity," is required.
As a necessary corollary to this ban, standing must be structured
to permit jurisdictional attacks by appropriate plaintiffs. This can be
accomplished by allowing collateral attacks on prior annexations by
78 The remedy which is the most consistent with the notion that the state has an
interest in how annexation should take place is an information in the nature of a writ
quo warranto. The use of informations allows an agent of the state to intercede when
local desires conflict with the state's annexation scheme. This method is used in Illinois.
ILL. AxN. STAT. ch. 112, §§ 9, 10 (Smith-Hurd 1966). Indiana, however, does not allow
this remedy. Stultz v. State ex tel. Steele, 65 Ind. 492 (1879).
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those persons victimized by leapfrog annexations. With these measures,
the jursidictional attack will provide a workable resolution of present
inadequacies in the annexation laws.
GEORGE T. MCNAUGHTON
